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The H-1B visa' is a category of employment-based nonimmigrant
visas 2 that allows skilled aliens in certain "specialty occupations ' 3 to
work in the United States. A potential U.S. employer of an eligible
foreign worker must file an H-1B visa petition with the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department ofJustice (DOJ) 4
and also a labor condition application (LCA) with the Employment
and Training Administration (ETA) of the Department of Labor
(DOL).5 H-lB visas are valid for three years and can be extended for
an additional three-year period.6
The "booming economy, [record-Ilow unemployment, and a
shortage of skilled [domestic] workers"7 during the 1990s have dra-
1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (H) (i) (b) (1994). This provision provides the statutory
authority of the H-lB visa program:
(a) (15) The term "immigrant" means every alien except an alien who is
within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens-... (H) an alien
(i) ... (b) subject to [8 U.S.C. § 1182(0) (2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)] who is
coming temporarily to the United States to perform services... in a specialty
occupation described in [8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (1994)] or as a fashion
model, who meets the requirements for the occupation specified in [8
U.S.C. § 1184(i) (2)] or, in the case of a fashion model, is of distinguished
merit and ability, and with respect to whom the Secretary of Labor deter-
mines and certifies to the Attorney General that the intending employer
has filed with the Secretary an application under [8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (1)]
Id. (emphasis added). This Note focuses exclusively on the H-1B program for "specialty
occupations."
2 Employment-based nonimmigrant visas authorize foreign workers to come to the
United States for "limited duration stays." U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REF., BECOMING
AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANT PoLICY 76-80 (1997) [hereinafter BECOMING AN
AMERICAN] (describing the statutory category of nonimmigrant admissions of foreigners as
"limited duration admissions [LDAs]"). According to the U.S. Commission on Immigra-
tion Reform, "[t]he term 'nonimmigrants' is misleading as some LDAs entering the United
States are really in transition to permanent residence, and other LDAs enter for temporary
stays and become permanent residents based on marriage or skills." Id. at 76 (footnote
omitted). These practices are significant given that "the United States has in the past regu-
larly admitted more temporary workers annually than the number of permanent residents
admitted on employment-based visas." Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free
Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal Immigration Polity, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1191
(1997) (footnote omitted). This Note uses the term "immigration" to include not only the
admission of aliens on immigrant visas for permanent residence, but also the admission of
aliens on a temporary basis, such as temporary workers with H-lB visas. See id. at 1153.
3 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i) (1); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii)-(iii) (2000).
4 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (2) (i) (A) (describing how a U.S. employer files an H-1B visa
petition with the INS); id. § 214.2(h) (4) (iii)-(iv) (listing criteria and general documentary
requirements for H-1B petitions involving a specialty occupation).
5 See8 U.S.C. § 1182(n) (1); 20 C.F.R § 655.730-34 (1998); U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRA-
TION REF., LEGAL IMMIGRATION: SETTING PRIORITIES 163-64 (1995) [hereinafter LEGAL
IMMIGRATION].
6 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (15) (ii) (B) (1); LEGAL IMMIGRATION, supra note 5, at 164; see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g) (4) (limiting the term of authorized admission to six years).
7 Gabrielle M. Buckley, Immigration and Nationality, 32 INT'L LAW. 471, 484 (1998).
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matically increased U.S. employers' demand for skilled foreign work-
ers. This trend is especially strong in the information technology (IT)
and computer industries.8 In recent years, the U.S. high-tech industry
has become the dominant participant in the H-1B visa program.9
Prior to the 1998 congressional amendment of the H-lB program,'0
Congress had capped the annual quota of new H-lB visas at 65,000.11
Because of this limitation, the existing H-1B visa program could no
longer meet the high-tech industry's voracious demand for foreign
skilled workers. Since 1997, H-1B visas have been oversubscribed:' 2
the number of H-1B admissions reached the statutory cap of 65,000
before the end of each fiscal year, and "employers petitioning late in
the year would be required to wait [another year] for the admission of
approved workers."'8
Unable to fulfill the unprecedented needs for skilled workers
under the existing H-1B visa program, the high-tech industry actively
lobbied Congress to raise the annual cap on the number of H-1B visas
granted to foreign workers. 14 However, the congressional effort to
8 See, e.g., Ana Mendieta, U.S. May Hike Number of High-TechJob Visas, CHI. SuN-TiMEs,
Oct. 19, 1998, at 12 ("Today there are more than 300,000 vacancies in information technol-
ogy positions in the United States.").
9 One commentator has nicely captured the rationale of the high-tech industry re-
garding its support of the H-1B visa program:
To put the point bluntly, American high-tech companies have exper-
ienced such rapid growth that they have collectively outpaced the ability of
America's educational system to produce a sufficient number of technically
knowledgeable workers. The gap between America's besieged educational
system and the acute labor needs of high-tech industries creates a situation
where American companies feel compelled to hire foreign nationals to fill
many strategic, technically demanding positions.
Joseph B. Costello et al., Ensuring Continued High-Tech Leadership with a Rational Immigration
Policy, in THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES OVER IMMIGRATION 240, 241 (Peter Duignan &
Lewis H. Gann eds., 1998); see also Tom Abate, Oddball Coalition Was the Loser in High-Tech
H-1B Struggle, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 26, 1998, at Cl (noting the importance of the H-1B visa
program to the high-tech industry). Tom Abate provides the percentage of H-lB visa ap-









1d, at Cl tbl.
10 See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
11 See8 U.S.C. § 1184(g) (1) (A) (1994) (amended 1998).
12 See Buckley, supra note 7, at 484.
13 BECOMrNG AN AmERICAN, supra note 2, at 79.
14 See Carla Marinucci &John Wildermuth, Silicon Valley CEOs Flex Political Muscle, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 3, 1998, at A17 (reporting the aggressive lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill by
Silicon Valley's Technology Network, a high-tech advocacy group).
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raise the annual H-1B visa cap met vigorous opposition from a vocal
minority in Congress, labor unions, and the White House.15 After
months of wrangling, the White House and congressional supporters
of the new H-1B bill finally reached a compromise in the fall of
1998.16 On October twenty-first of that year, President Clinton signed
into law the compromise bill, the American Competitiveness and
Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 (ACWIA) .17 The new H-1B visa
law nearly doubles the available number of H-1B visas over the next
three years-from the current level of 65,000 to 115,000 in 1999 and
2000, and to 107,500 in 2001-before reverting to 65,000 in 2002.18
The law also addresses concerns over the potentially adverse impact of
the H-1B visa program on the domestic workforce and potential
abuses of the program by H-1B employers.' 9
This Note examines and critiques the congressional amendment
to the H-lB visa program under the ACWIA of 1998 and its aftermath.
Part I provides background and describes the H-1B visa program prior
to the 1998 congressional amendment.20 Part II examines the contro-
versy and debates surrounding the congressional effort to raise the
annual H-1B visa cap, the ultimate result of which was the enactment
of the ACWIA. 21 This Note examines the intense debate between ad-
15 See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
16 See Christi Harlan, House Approves Liberalization of Visas for High-Tech Workers, AT-
LANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 25, 1998, at F2; White House Fact Sheet on H-1B VIsa Agreemen U.S.
NEWswIRE, Sept. 24, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories File [here-
inafter White House Fact Sheet]; Aaron Zitner, Foreign Worker Bill Approved: House OK's Deal
Brokered with White House to Raise Visa Quota for Skilled Labor, BoSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 1998,
at C1.
17 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. IV, § 411(a), 112 Stat. 2681-642 (1998).
18 See White House Fact Sheet; supra note 16.
19 See, e.g., Perkins Cole, Congress Passes Legislation on Employment of Foreign "High Tech"
Workers, OR. EMPLoYmENT L. LETR, Feb. 5, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Oregon
News Service File (describing labor protection provisions of the new H-1B visa bill, includ-
ing "no-benching" and equal-benefits rules).
20 For an excellent overview of the rules of the pre-amendment H-1B visa program,
see Constantine S. Potamianos, The Temporary Admission of Skilled Workers to the United States
Under the H-1B Program: Economic Boon or Domestic Work Force Scourge, 11 GEO. IMMmR. L.J.
789, 791-96 (1997). For a more in-depth treatment of the pre-amendment H-1B visa rules,
see Steven A. Clark, H-1B Specialty Workers, in 30TH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIzA-
TION INSTrUTE, at 51 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1021,
1997); Michael Maggio et al., Immigration Fundamentals for International Lawyers, 13 Am. U.
INT'L L. RE-v. 857, 881-90 (1998).
21 For the legislative history underlying the 1998 congressional amendment of the H-
1B visa program, see generally 144 CONG. Rlc. E2323 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Smith) (arguing that Congress should give the IT industry the benefit of the doubt
despite "inconclusive" evidence as to labor shortage); 144 CONG. Rxc. S12,748-49 (daily ed.
Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (acknowledging that the amendment will be
passed and outlining the compromise); 144 CONG. Rxc. S12,254-56 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998)
(statement of Sen. Harkin) (explaining objections to the proposed amendment); 144
CONG. REc. S10,877-79 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1998) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (explaining
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vocates and critics of the program over its potential impact on na-
tional economic development and the domestic workforce; both views
were highly influential in shaping the recent changes to the H-lB visa
program. This Part also briefly looks at the aftermath of the ACWIA
and the failure of the Act to achieve the original intent of its sponsors.
The H-lB visa quota remains oversubscribed and the debate over
whether to raise the visa quota again continues on Capitol Hill.
Part III presents a critical analysis of the newly amended H-lB visa
program under the ACWIA. Despite some improvement over the pre-
vious program, this Note argues that the new H-lB visa program
under the ACWIA is inadequate either to meet the needs of national
economic interests, or to provide sufficient protection for the domes-
tic workforce. This Note proposes a radical liberalization of the H-lB
visa program: elimination of the annual quota of H-lB visas and struc-
tural transformation of the federal agencies overseeing the H-lB visa
program. The government should shift its focus and resources from
the current system of bureaucratic red tape in the visa application
processes (e.g., maintaining restrictive visa quotas) to the policing of
potential abuses of the program (e.g., potential labor malpractices by
employers and visa fraud schemes by overseas body brokers). This
Note applies current general immigration-reform proposals to the
particular context of employment-based nonimmigrant visa programs
such as the H-lB visa program. It suggests liberalizing immigration
policy to promote national economic welfare by following the princi-
ples of free trade22 and consolidating the enforcement responsibilities
of immigration-related labor standards within the DOL. 23
In essence, this Note proposes that we view the H-lB visa program
not merely as an immigration policy, but rather as a new paradigm of
economic and labor policy. Under the proposed approach, the liber-
the agreement between the White House and the supporters of the amendment); 144
CONG. REC. H8572-73 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Slaughter) (criticizing
the compromise process); 144 CONG. REc. H8529-33 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Smith) (offering a substitute amendment to the House); 144 CONG. REc. H6820-23
(daily ed. July 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. Watt) (offering revisions of the proposed
amendment to the House); 144 CONG. REc. H6698-02 (daily ed.July 29, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Smith) (offering revision of proposed amendment to the House); 144 CONG. REC.
S4954-60 (daily ed. May 18, 1998) (statements of Sens. Hatch, Abraham, and Feinstein)
(supporting various revisions of the amendment); 144 CONG. REc. S2715-18 (daily ed. Mar.
27, 1998) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (discussing the "serious problems facing the high
tech industry"); and 144 CONG. REc. S1508 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Abraham) (proposing original amendment to the Senate).
22 See generally Chang, supra note 2 (applying principles of free trade to immigration
law and advocating specific liberalizing reforms of immigration policy to promote national
economic welfare).
23 See BECOMSNG AN AmsacAN, supra note 2, at 169-74 (recommending that "all re-
sponsibility for enforcement of immigration-related standards for employers be consoli-
dated in the Department of Labor").
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alization and optimization of the H-1B program by relaxing various
restrictions-in particular the annual visa cap-and the consolidation
of supervisory functions of the H-1B program in the DOL 24 (as op-
posed to the current division between the INS and the DOL) would
better protect American economic competitiveness and the domestic
workforce than the existing H-1B program.2 5 The liberalization of the
program and the consolidation of administrative functions would en-
hance the flexibility and efficiency of the H-1B program thereby pro-
moting American competitiveness. In addition, the direct, focused
supervision of the program by the DOL, with its expertise in labor
protection would effectively protect the domestic workforce from po-
tential abuses or adverse impacts of the H-lB program. Current legis-
lative activity appears to be considering this approach in the face of
the realization that the current H-1B visa system, even as amended
under the 1998 ACWIA, has failed to provide effective protection for
the high-tech industry and the domestic workforce. 26
I
THE H-lB VISA PROGRAM PRIOR TO THE 1998
CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT
As commentators have noted, "[t]he employment of foreign
workers as a supplement to the available domestic labor force has
been a recurrent public policy issue throughout the history of the
United States. '27 On November 29, 1990, President Bush signed the
Immigration Act of 199028 (IMMACT) into law. The new H-lB visa
provision 29 within IMNIACT was the result of congressional efforts to
24 See id. (describing various advantages of having the DOL enforce immigration-re-
lated standards for employers).
25 See, e.g., Costello et al., supra note 9, at 253-55 (arguing that "keeping American
high-tech companies globally competitive should be a national priority" and that the
United States should pursue a rational immigration policy through the H-1B program to
ensure its leadership position in the global high-tech market); Potamianos, supra note 20,
at 809-10 (concluding that the H-lB visa program is "an economic boon that, at least in the
computer industry, allows the United States to remain at the forefront of the global
economy").
26 See infra Part II.D.
27 VERNON M. BRiucrs, JR., IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE Am.ucAN LABOR FORCE 96
(1984). See generally id. at 96-127 (presenting the history of the U.S. nonimmigrant labor
policy from 1917 to the early 1980s). Briggs views nonimmigrant labor policy not only as a
traditional means of overcoming labor shortages, but more importantly in recent years, as
a means of reducing illegal immigration. See id. at 117-20.
28 Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.). Congress subsequently amended IMMAI7T to add labor-protective
measures. See Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments
of 1991, Pub. L. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
29 See8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (H) (i) (b) (1994).
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increase admissions of foreign skilled workers into the United States.30
According to one commentator, IMMACT and the H-lB visa program
marked a "fundamental shift in immigration thinking... [due] to the
increasingly competitive global environment of the late 1980s."3 This
legislation indicated that the desire to enhance American competitive-
ness in the global economy and the need for high-technology skills
were driving U.S. "immigration policy toward an economic focus."3 2
Although it facilitated the admission of skilled foreign workers
into the United States, IMMACT also placed numerous restrictions on
the H-lB visa program. IMMACT placed an annual cap of 65,000 on
H-lB visas,33 a number that apparently was "randomly chosen without
regard to American businesses' need for or actual use of these visas." 34
The restrictions limited the validity of the H-lB visas to three years,35
although they are renewable for an additional three-year period.3 6
The H-lB visa program allows U.S. employers to hire skilled for-
eign workers in certain "specialty occupations."37 Under the current
rule, a "specialty occupation" is defined as:
[A] n occupation which requires theoretical and practical applica-
tion of a body of highly specialized knowledge in fields of human
30 See Potamianos, supra note 20, at 789; Robert G. Werner, The New Immigration Act:
Impact on the ComputerIndustiy, COMPUTER LAW., Mar. 1991, at 21, 21; see also LEGAL IMMIGRA-
TION, supra note 5, at 5 (noting one of the purposes of the IMMACT was "meeting present
and future labor market needs by increasing the proportion admitted for employment-
based reasons, giving higher priority to the entry of professionals and highly-skilled per-
sons, and retaining procedures for helping to ensure that foreign workers do not adversely
affect employment opportunities for U.S. workers"); MICHAEL C. LEMAY, ANATOMY OF A
PUBLIC PoLicy: THE REFORM OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAw 143-49 (1994)
(describing the legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1990); Charles C. Foster, The
New Immigration Act of 1990: Major Reform of Legal Immigration, Hous. Lmw., Jan./Feb. 1991,
at 26 (presenting a general overview of the Immigration Act of 1990).
31 Potamianos, supra note 20, at 797 (footnotes omitted).
32 1o& One commentator noted:
[T]he 1990 Act is a product of political reality-a compromise between the
[INS], labor unions, the immigration bar, and an assemblage of different
groups with varying philosophies. In a greater sense, though, the 1990 Act,
despite its compromises, is a powerful legislative means toward America's
aspiration to lead in an age of multinational economic cooperation and
trade.
StevenJ. Klearman, Nonimmigrant Business VIsas After the Immigration Act of 1990,28 GoNz. L.
REv. 53, 54 (1992) (footnote omitted).
33 See8 U.S.C. § 1184(g) (1) (A) (1994).
One practitioner prophetically stated in 1992 that "[w]hether this new limitation will
create a visa backlog and consequently force U.S. employers to wait to employ foreign
professionals remains to be seen." Klearman, supra note 32, at 57. Less than five years
later, demand for H-1B visas outpaced supply, creating a backlog. See infra Part II.
34 Buckley, supra note 7, at 484.
35 See 8 C.FR. § 214.2(h) (9) (iii) (A) (1) (2000).
36 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g) (4) ("In the case of a nonimmigrant described in [8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (1994)], the period of authorized admission as such a nonimmi-
grant may not exceed 6 years."); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (15) (ii) (B) (1).
37 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii)-(iii).
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endeavor including, but not limited to, architecture, engineering,
mathematics, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine and
health, education, business specialties, accounting, law, theology,
and the arts, and which requires the attainment of a bachelor's de-
gree or higher in a specific specialty, or its equivalent, as a mini-
mum for entry into the occupation in the United States.38
In order to qualify as a specialty occupation position, the opening po-
sition must meet certain criteria including the requirement of a bacca-
laureate or higher degree.3 9
The INS and the DOL currently share responsibility for the ad-
ministration and supervision of the H-1B visa program.40 Prior to fil-
ing an H-1B visa petition with the Regional Service Center of the
INS,41 a potential employer of an H-lB worker must first file a labor
condition application (LCA) with the regional ETA office of the
DOL.42 The LCA is the equivalent of a DOL labor attestation, docu-
38 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii).
39 See id. § 214.2(h) (4) (iii) (A).
40 In addition to the division of supervisory responsibilities for the H-1B program
between the INS and the DOL, the Department of Commerce exercises some administra-
tive control over the H-1B visa program through an export control license program. See
Deanna Hodgin, Rule Hurts Hiring of Foreign Tech Workers, REcoRDEi, Oct. 19, 1998, at 1.
Under the "deemed export" rule, the Department of Commerce "deems exposing citizens
of nations perceived to be antagonistic to the United States to technical information to be
the same as exporting the company's product" to that nation. Id. Before these foreign
nationals begin working in sensitive technical positions, employers must pay for an export
control license and receive approval from the Department of Commerce, a process that
can take six months. See id. (reporting unhappiness of the Silicon Valley companies with
the "deemed export" rule, and the potential conflict between the Commerce rule and the
Equal Employment Opportunity rules).
41 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (2) (i) (describing how a U.S. employer files an H-1B visa
petition with the INS); id. § 214.2(h) (4) (iii)-(iv) (listing criteria and general documentary
requirements for H-1B petitions involving a specialty occupation); Clark, supra note 20, at
59-74 (detailing substantive requirements for the H-1B visa petition). The INS has wide
discretion in deciding whether to grant an H-IB visa. See All Aboard Worldwide Couriers,
Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 8 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (rejecting plaintiff's charge
that the INS abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's H-lB visa).
42 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.730 (1998). The statutory provision on the LCA requires that:
(A) The employer-
(i) is offering and will offer during the period of authorized em-
ployment to aliens admitted or provided status as an H-1B nonimmi-
grant wages that are at least-
(I) the actual wage level paid by the employer to all other individ-
uals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employ-
ment in question, or
(II) the prevailing wage level for the occupational classification in
the area of employment, whichever is greater, based on the best infor-
mation available as of the time of filing the application, and
(ii) will provide working conditions for such a nonimmigrant that
will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly
employed.
(B) There is not a strike or lockout in the course of a labor dispute in the
occupational classification at the place of employment.
(C) The employer, at the time of filing the application-
AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
menting actual or prevailing wages,43 working conditions,44 absence
of strikes or lockouts,45 and notice of filing the LCA with bargaining
representatives of the employees46 in the workplace of an H-1B
worker. The Wage and Hour Division of the DOL is responsible for
investigating and enforcing matters related to the LCA program.47
The LCA program requires that employers pay H-1B foreign pro-
fessionals "no less than the greater of... [t] he actual wage paid to the
employer's other employees at the worksite with similar experience
and qualifications... or... [t]he prevailing wage level for the occupa-
tional classification in the area [of] intended employment."48 The
DOL regulations provide methods to determine the actual wage49 and
the prevailing wage50 for H-1B workers.
In addition to the wage requirement, potential H-lB employers
must certify to the DOL that they "will provide working conditions for
such nonimmigrants that will not adversely affect the working condi-
tions of workers similarly employed,"51 and that at the time of hiring
H-lB workers, "[t]here is not a strike or lockout in the course of a
(i) has provided notice of the filing under this paragraph to the
bargaining representative (if any) of the employer's employees in the
occupational classification and area for which aliens are sought, or
(ii) if there is no such bargaining representative, has provided no-
tice of filing in the occupational classification through such methods
as physical posting in conspicuous locations at the place of employ-
ment or electronic notification to employees in the occupational classi-
fication for which H-lB nonimmigrants are sought.
(D) The application shall contain a specification of the number of workers
sought, the occupational classification in which the workers will be em-
ployed, and wage rate and conditions under which they will be
employed.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
For a discussion of the labor condition application process, see Clark, supra note 20, at
74-113; Potamianos, supra note 20, at 794-96. Some commentators criticize the labor con-
dition application provision as highly burdensome to employers. See Angelo A. Paparelli &
Mona D. Patel, The Immigration Act of 1990: Death Knell for the H-1B?, 25 INT'L LAw. 995,
1001-11 (1991) ('The 1990 Act dramatically expands the burdens and liabilities on em-
ployers who use the H-lB provision to sponsor foreign workers."); Werner, supra note 30,
at 22; see also National Ass'n of Mfrs. v. United States Dep't of Labor, No. 95-0715, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10478, at *1 (D.D.C.July 22, 1996) (challenging under the Administrative
Procedures Act certain regulations promulgated by the DOL under the H-lB visa pro-
gram), costs and fees proceeding at 962 F. Supp. 191 (D.D.C. 1997), affd 159 F.3d 597 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
43 See 20 C.F.R § 655.731; Clark, supra note 20, at 79-92.
44 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.732.
45 See id. § 655.733.
46 See id. §655.734.
47 See id. § 655.800; Clark, supra note 20, at 118-25.
48 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(d) (1) (emphasis added).
49 See id. § 655.731 (a) (1); Clark, supra note 20, at 89-92; Potamianos, supra note 20, at
795-96.
50 See 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a) (2); Clark, supra note 20, at 79-89; Potamianos, supra note
20, at 795.
51 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(d) (2).
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labor dispute in the occupational classification at the place of
employment."52
II
THE AMERICAN COMPETrIVENESS AND WORKFORCE
IMPROVEMENT Aar OF 1998: CONGRESSIONAL
AMENDMENT OF T=E H-lB
VISA PROGRAM
In formulating the H-lB visa program, Congress recognized the
increasing reliance of U.S. businesses on highly skilled foreign profes-
sionals.53 This Part of the Note describes how the dramatic increase
in demand for foreign skilled workers and the consequent oversub-
scription of the H-lB visas in recent years forced Congress to address
in 1998 the same "tension" that it had to face in 1990 and to arrive
again at "a compromise between... the [INS], labor unions, the im-
migration bar, and an assemblage of different groups with varying phi-
losophies. '5 4  These factors eventually led to congressional
amendment of the H-1B visa program in the fall of 1998, but only
after months of political wrangling between supporters and oppo-
nents of the H-1B program.
A. The H-1B Visa Cap Crisis: Oversubscription of H-lB Visas
The "booming economy, low unemployment, and[ ] shortage of
skilled workers in recent years"55 have caused demand for skilled for-
eign workers to reach an unprecedented level, especially in the IT and
computer industries.56 The U.S. high-tech industry has increasingly
relied on the H-1B visa program to fill its needs for skilled workers. 57
As demand for the foreign skilled workers skyrocketed, what had once
52 Id. § 655.730(d)(3).
53 See Klearman, supra note 32, at 65 (noting "Congress clearly intended, through
passage of the 1990 Act, to... attract[ ] to the U.S. highly qualified foreign workers" and
that "nonimmigrant visas remain useful tools to bring U.S. business the knowledge neces-
sary to lead in an age of multinational economic cooperation and trade").
54 Id. at 53-54.
55 Buckley, supra note 7, at 484.
56 See 144 CONG. REc. S4955 (daily ed. May 18, 1998) (statement of Sen. Abraham)
("A study by the U.S. Department of Commerce indicates a projected growth of informa-
tion-technology and high-tech jobs over the next decade of approximately 130,000 per
year, [but] we will only be producing [about] 25 percent of the graduates needed to fill
these jobs over that timeframe."); see also Relieving the Skills Squeeze, D~morr Navs, Aug. 9,
1998, at B8 (reporting "ravenous" demand for and severe shortage of highly skilled work-
ers in high-tech industries).
57 See Potamianos, supra note 20, at 801-06 (asserting that the H-lB visa program plays
a vital role in the U.S. computer industry). See generally Edward Wong, The Streets Are Paved
With PC's: Wall Street and Silicon Alley Lure a New Breed of High-Tech Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES,




been merely the possibility of an H-1B visa backlog became a reality.58
In 1997, H-1B admissions reached the annual statutory cap of 65,00059
before the end of the fiscal year for the first time. 60 The oversubscrip-
tion of H-lB visas forced the INS to announce in August of that year
"the formation of a waiting list because approved workers would be
ineligible to enter until the start of the next fiscal year."'6 1 In 1998, H-
lB visa admissions reached the cap in May.62 Experts projected that
admissions would reach the limit even earlier in 1999,63 had Congress
not raised the visa cap. Facing severe and widespread shortages of
skilled information technology professionals and unable to meet the
demand for skilled workers under the existing H-lB visa program,64
the high-tech industry began to lobby Congress to raise the annual
cap on H-lB visa grants to foreign workers. 65
B. Legislative History of the ACWIA
In early 1998, Republican Senator Spencer Abraham of Michigan
sponsored legislation addressing the issue of the annual H-lB visa cap
and the needs of the high-technology labor market; the Senate de-
58 See Klearman, supra note 32, at 57.
59 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g) (1) (A) (1994) (amended 1998) ("The total number of aliens
who may be issued visas or otherwise provided nonimmigrant status during any fiscal year
(beginning with fiscal year 1992) ... under [8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (H) (i) (b) (1994)] may
not exceed 65,000.").
60 See Buckley, supra note 7, at 484; see also Clark, supra note 20, at 57-58 ("[O]n Au-
gust 29, 1997 [this cap] was finally reached."). October 1 is the beginning of the fiscal
year. Id.
61 BECOMING AN AMERICAN, supra note 2, at 79.
62 See Relieving the Skills Squeeze, supra note 56, at B8. This article also reports that:
America's booming economy has created millions of jobs during the past
six years, but it also has stimulated ravenous demand for highly skilled
workers. Yet... our educational system isn't pumping out enough gradu-
ates to slake the thirst for high-tech industries. This forces many bosses to
face a tough choice: Import talent or do without. That quandary became
academic on May 8, when the United States hit its annual limit of 65,000
professional immigrant workers.
Id.
63 See Timothy Burn, High-Tech Firms Defend Pursuit of Foreign Workers: Some See Losses for
U.S. Citizens, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at D14 ("[M]any recruiters predict the annual
quota of 65,000 temporary work visas, known as H-lBs, would be reached by December
[1998] without any changes in the law."). Even after nearly doubling the H-lB visa quota
under the ACWIA, the H-1B visa cap was nevertheless reached inJune 1999. See infra note
101 and accompanying text.
64 See Bum, supra note 63, at D14 (quoting one estimate of a shortage of 340,000
qualified high-tech workers).
65 See id. at D14 (noting that "the heaviest lobbying for the bill came from Silicon
Valley"); Marinucci & rldermuth, supra note 14, at A17 (describing aggressive lobbying




bated the matter in early 1998.66 The Senate, with little opposition,67
passed the American Competitiveness Act raising the annual cap on
H-1B visas. 68 However, the attempt to raise the H-lB visa cap met
strong opposition in the House of Representatives from traditionally
pro-labor Democrats 69 and anti-immigration Republicans. 70 These
legislators received the backing of labor unions71 and professional en-
gineering organizations such as the Institute of Electrical and Elec-
tronics Engineers-USA (IEEE-USA).72 The opposition to the proposal
to raise the H-1B visa cap transcended traditional party lines, forming
an "odd coalition of liberal, pro-labor Democrats and conservative,
anti-immigration Republicans. '73 Under pressure from labor unions
and pro-labor Democrats, the White House initially opposed the new
H-1B visa bill due to concerns over the perceived inadequacy of the
66 See 144 CONG. REC. S12,748 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Abraham)
(noting that the Senate Judiciary Committee first held hearings on high-tech labor market
needs in February 1998).
67 See generally 144 CONG. REc. S4954-61 (daily ed. May 18, 1998) (detailing the Senate
debate over raising the annual H-lB visa cap).
68 See S. 1723, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998).
69 See Christi Harlan, Virsa Vote for Skilled Workers Is Canceled: New Visas Won't Be Available
Until Oct. 1, Leaving Gap in Supply, AUSTIN AM.-STATEsMAN, Aug. 7, 1998, at D1 ("[T]he
scaled-back version didn't fly with House Democrats, even those whose districts include
concentrations of high-tech companies.").
70 See, e.g., Patrick Buchanan, Commentary, Sellout of High-TechJobs, WAsH. TiMES, Aug.
19, 1998, at A17 (criticizing the H-1B visa program for transforming the American work-
place into the "Asian environment," and the Silicon Valley companies for failing to "Ameri-
caniz[e]" their labor force).
Republicans are deeply divided on the issue of the H-1B visa program. See, e.g., Spen-
cer Abraham & David McIntosh, Commentary, Why America Needs Temporary Foreign Workers,
WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 1, 1998, at A16 ("On this issue [of H-1B visas], Pat Buchanan... [is]
wrong, and America's innovators are right."); William Branigin, House Sets Aside Bill to Allow
Hiring of More Foreign Workers: Measure Sought by High-Tech Firms Had Split GOP, WASH. POST,
Aug. 1, 1998, at A2 (discussing the split among Republicans on the issue of raising the H-
lB visa cap).
71 See WilliamJ. Holstein, Give Us Your Wired, Your Highly Skilled: Tech Firms Are Winning
the Battle of the Visas, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Oct. 5, 1998, at 53 (reporting the demands
of labor organizations like the Communications Workers of America and the AFL-CIO that
"Americans displaced by global competition or downsizings ought to have first priority in
taking the high-paying jobs").
72 See John R. Reinert, Commentary, Trojan Horse in the Free Labor Market?, WASH.
TIMEs, Sept. 26, 1998, at C2 (asserting that the H-lB visa program hurts U.S. engineers);
Zitner, supra note 16, at C1 (quoting IEEE-USA president John Reinert as stating that
"'[the evidence doesn't suggest that there is a labor shortage, and there is no need to
increase the number of visas'"). According to IEEE-USA, a report by an outplacement firm
showed that high-tech industries have laid off 143,000 workers in 1998, more than any
other sector of the economy. See Robert MacMillan, H-1B Visa Bill Ready for Passage, NEw-
sBYrMs, Oct. 8, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories File (reporting
IEEE-USA president-elect Paul Kostek's argument that "[i]t's bizarre policy to give the in-
dustries laying off the most US workers special access to an expanded foreign guest-worker
program").
73 Abate, supra note 9, at Cl.
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job-protection provisions in the original bill.74 As the House of Repre-
sentatives, prepared to consider the bill before the August recess "the
White House issued a public veto threat and listed... changes it was
seeking to the bill."75 After months of wrangling and intense negotia-
tions, the White House and the congressional supporters of the bill
finally reached a compromise on September 23, 1998, in which they
agreed to raise the H-1B visa cap while including additional protective
measures for American workers. 76 The House passed the new com-
promise H-1B visa bill the next day.77 However, the bill faced an un-
expected sudden death in the Senate, when a small number of
senators led by Democrat Tom Harkin of Iowa blocked the vote.78 Af-
ter a skillful legislative maneuver by its supporters, the H-lB visa bill
made a remarkable, eleventh-hour comeback as part of the omnibus
appropriations bill.79 On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed
74 See Timothy Burn, Clinton's About-Face on Visas Irks Silicon Valley, WASH. TiMEs, Aug.
6, 1998, at B7; Harlan, supra note 69, at DI; Carolyn Lochhead & Tom Abate, High-Tech
Visa Bill Held Up: Clinton Administration Asks for 3 Conditions, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 1, 1998, at
D1.
75 144 CONG. REc. S12,749 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
76 See 144 CONG. REc. S10,877 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1998) (statement of Sen. Abraham)
(announcing the agreement between the White House and congressional supporters of
the new H-lB visa bill); White HouseFact Sheet, supra note 16 (excerpting press release by the
White House Press Office on the congressional-White House agreement on H-1B); see also
Holstein, supra note 71, at 53 ("The issue has forced Clinton to choose which wing of his
own party he will cater to-the traditional pro-labor base or the high-tech crowd, many of
whom are major contributors .... 'The White House capitulated to industry groups two
days before a fund-raising trip to Silicon Valley,' charged John R. Reinert, president of
[IEEE-USA].").
77 See 144 CONG. REc. S12,749 (statement of Sen. Abraham).
78 See 144 CONG. REc. S12,256 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (statement of Sen. Harkin)
(urging the Senate to wait another year before raising the H-1B cap in light of recent job
cut announcements from the high-tech industry); see also Bill to Bring Technology Workers to
U.S. Dies, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1998, at C2 (reporting the 11th-hour death of the H-1B visa
bill); Ashley Dunn, Plan to Increase High-Tech Work Visas Dies in Senate, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 10,
1998, at CI (same); Aaron Zitner, High-Tech Visa Bill Appears Doomed, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
13, 1998, at D1 (same).
79 Congress enacted the new H-1B visa bill, the American Competitiveness and
Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, as Title IV of Division C of the Omnibus Consoli-
dated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 1999, Pub. L. 105-277, §§ 401-18,
112 Stat. 2681-641 to -657 (1998). See Tom Abate &Jon Swartz, 11th-Hour Victory for Tech:
Visa Increase, R&D Tax Measure in Budget Bill S.F. CHRON., Oct. 16, 1998, at B1 ("In an
adroit political move, tech leaders got several of their stalled measures included in the
$500 billion omnibus appropriations bill that was hammered out yesterday between Con-
gress and the White House."); Mark Leibovich, High Tech Is King of the Hilk Rash of Legisla-
tive Wins Has Industry Celebrating, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1998, at FI ("[T]echnology lobbyists,
executives and congressional supporters managed to attach the bill to the broader budget
package."); see also Matthew Morrissey, Expansion of Visas for Skilled Workers to Go in Omnibus,
CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 13, 1998, available at 1998 WL 13131413 (explaining how the H-1B
visa bill survived in the Senate). Matthew Morrissey reports that
Congressional and White House negotiators have decided to add legislation
expanding the number of H-lB visas for highly skilled workers to the omni-
bus appropriations bill .... [The original version of the bill] passed the
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the controversial compromise H-1B visa bill into law: the American
Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998.80 The INS
and the DOL have started implementing the changes in the H-1B visa
program under the ACWIA.81
C. Changes in the H-1B Visa Program Under the ACWIA
The most obvious and controversial change to the H-1B visa pro-
gram introduced by the ACWIA is the dramatic increase in the num-
ber of H-lB visas made available to skilled foreign workers over the
three-year period beginning in 1999. The ACWIA increases the an-
nual H-1B visa cap from the 1998 level of 65,000 to 115,000 in 1999
and 2000, and to 107,500 in 2001.82 In 2002, the annual H-lB visa cap
reverts to 65,000.83
The new law imposes a fee of $500 for each H-1B visa petition by
employers (in addition to the existing filing fee of $11084), from
which Congress expects to raise at least $75 million annually to fund
scholarships for underprivileged students in math and science, as well
as providing job training for American workers.85 Some of the money
House by a 288-133 vote. But Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, Friday objected to
unanimous passage of the bill in the Senate. Because Senate Majority
Leader Lott is taking up only bills that can pass by unanimous consent,
GOP leaders and the administration today agreed to place the H-1B legisla-
tion into the omnibus appropriations bill, which is expected to be the only
roll call vote taken by the Senate this week.
Id.
80 §§ 401-18, 112 Stat. at 2681-641 to -657; see also Alyce C. Katayama & Carolyn P.
Kinney, Increase in Visas Creates Temporary Solution to Worker Shortage, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Nov. 2, 1998, at 15 (reporting the President's signing of the new H-1B visa bill).
81 See, e.g., Labor Condition Applications and Requirements for Employers Using
Nonimmigrants on H-lB Visas in Specialty Occupations and as Fashion Models: Labor Cer-
tification Process for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States, 64 Fed. Reg.
628 (1999) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 655-56) (proposed Dec. 23, 1998) (publishing
notice of proposed rulemaking and request for comments by Wage and Hour Division of
the Employment Standards Administration in the Department of Labor regarding changes
to DOL regulations on the labor condition application of the H-lB program under the
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998); Petitioning Require-
ments for the H-1B Nonimmigrant Classification Under Public Law 105-277, 63 Fed. Reg.
65,657 (1998) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 214, 299) (proposed Nov. 25, 1998)
(publishing interim rule with request for comments by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service of the Department of'Justice regarding changes to INS regulations on filing fee and
filing requirements for the H-1B petition under the American Competitiveness and
Workforce Improvement Act of 1998).
82 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(A).(i-iv) (Supp. IV 1998); 144 CONG. REc. E2323 (daily
ed. Nov. 12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Smith); White House Fact Shee4 supra note 16; see also
Coie, supra note 19 (listing labor protection provisions in the new H-1B visa bill).
83 See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g) (1) (A) (v); White House Fact Sheet supra note 16.
84 SeeJ. Traci Hong &J. David Swaim, Jr., Act Doesn't Live Up to Its Name, TEx. LAw.,
Jan. 18, 1999, at 26.
85 See White House Fact Sheet supra note 16.
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will also fund the administration and enforcement activities of the
DOL under the H-lB visa program. 86
The ACWIA also provides strict labor protection provisions for
domestic and H-lB workers employed by "H-lB dependent" compa-
nies.8 7 The Act defines an employer with more than fifty-one full-time
employees as "H-lB dependent," if H-lB visa holders account for
more than 15 percent of its workforce.88 Under the ACWIA, an H-lB
dependent employer must attest that (1) "it has not displaced and will
not displace a U.S. worker for a period of 180 days, beginning 90 days
before the filing of the H-lB petition and ending 90 days after the
filing of the H-lB petition;" 9 (2) that "it will not place the H-1B
worker with another employer ... where there are 'indicia of an em-
ployment relationship' between the H-lB worker and the second em-
ployer unless it first asks the other employer whether it has or intends
to displace a U.S. worker within the 180-day period;"90 and (3) that "it
has taken good-faith steps to recruit U.S. workers using procedures
that meet industrywide standards and offering at least the same wage
offered to the H-lB worker."91 These attestation provisions for the H-
lB dependent employers will expire in 2002, when the H-lB visa cap
reverts to the pre-amendment level of 65,000.92
The AGWIA increases the fines and debarment period for willful
violators of the H-lB program.93 In addition, the new H-lB law pro-
vides the DOL with expanded investigatory authority.9 4 The ACWIA
also provides whistleblower protection for those employees who coop-
erate with DOL investigations of potential H-lB violations.9 5
By imposing the "equal-benefits rule"9 6 upon H-lB employers,
the ACWIA eliminates "the financial incentive to hire under-compen-
sated foreign temporary workers."9 7 Under this rule, employers "must
offer... H-lB workers benefits and eligibility for benefits (including
participation in health, life, disability, and other insurance plans, re-
86 See Coie, supra note 19; White House Fact Shee4 supra note 16.
87 See White House Fact Shee4 supra note 16.
88 See id. The definition of H-lB dependency is more accommodating for small em-
ployers and start-up companies: "A company with one to 25 full-time equivalent employees
is considered to be H-1B dependent if it has more than seven H-1B workers. A company
with 26 to 50 full-time equivalent employees is considered to be H-lB dependent if it has
more than 12 H-1B workers." Hong & Swaim, supra note 84, at 26.




93 See White House Fact Sheet supra note 16 (increasing the debarment period from one
to two years, and fines from $1000 to $5000 per violation).
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 Coie, supra note 19.
97 Wite House Fact Sheet supra note 16.
20001 1687
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tirement and savings plans, bonuses, and stock options) on the same
basis, and in accordance with the same criteria, as [similarly-em-
ployed] U.S. workers."98
Finally, the "no-benching provision"99 of the ACWIA obligates
employers to pay H-1B workers the full wage stated on the H-1B peti-
tion, "even if the worker is in nonproductive status (benched)" due to
the employer's decision or due to the worker's lack of the requisite
job permit or license. a00
D. Aftermath: The H-1B Visa Cap Crisis Continues
Despite the near-doubling of the annual quota of H-1B visas by
the ACWIA, the number of available high-tech visas failed to satiate
the demands of the rapidly expanding high-tech industry. In June
1999, more than three months before the end of the fiscal year, the
annual allotment of H-lB visas, 115,000 for that year, ran out yet
again.101 This marked "the third year in a row that the available visas
ran out before the end of the fiscal year."10 2 Experts expect that the
industry will deplete the allotment of H-lB visas for fiscal year 2000 by
the end of January 2000.103 High-tech industry executives have al-
ready begun complaining that the ACWIA's expansion of the H-1B
visa program "was insufficient and warn that the industry faces serious
roadblocks unless it gets more foreign workers." 0 4 As it had done the
prior year, the high-tech industry started lobbying Congress to raise
the H-lB visa cap' 0 5 and legislators soon introduced several bills on
Capitol Hill to increase the number of skilled foreigners allowed to
work in the United States. However, these attempts have all met stiff
resistance from pro-labor groups, 0 6 and the Clinton administration
has threatened to veto any legislation that raises the H-lB visa cap. 10 7
98 Coie, supra note 19.
99 1&.
100 Id
101 See W'illiam Branigin, A Push for More Special Work Visas: Tech Employers Say Higher
Limit on Foreigners Isn't High Enough, WASH. POSr, June 25, 1999, at A4; see also Stanley Mail-
man & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Dealing With the H-lB Vrisa Cap, N.Y. LJ., June 28, 1999, at 3
(describing the INS's interim rule in the face of another oversubscription of H-lB visas in
1999).
102 Branigin, supra note 101, at A4.
103 See Michael D. Towle, Passport to the Future: Bills Seek to Raise High-Tech Visas Cap to
Meet Worker Shortage, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 26, 1999, at 1C.
104 Branigin, supra note 101, at A4.
105 See Finlay Lewis, High-Tech Firms Ask Congress to Up Foreign Worker Limits, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 4, 1999, at I1.
106 See, e.g., Patrick Thibodeau & Stewart Deck, GOP Eyes Boost in Foreign Workers: Con-
gressional Leaders Want H-1B Vias Cap Raised to 200K to Ease IT Labor Shortage, CoM-
PUTERWORLD, Aug. 9, 1999, at 1 (noting labor opposition).
107 See Timothy Burn, Lauyer Helps High-Tech Firms Find, Retain Foreign Workers, WAsH.
TiMES, Nov. 29, 1999, at D19.
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Republican Representative David Dreier, the chairman of the
House Rules Committee, introduced the New Workers for Economic
Growth Act'08 in early August of 1999.109 His bill and its companion
bill in the Senate,110 sponsored by Republican Senator Phil Gramm,
would raise the annual H-lB visa quota from the current level of
115,000 to 200,000 between 2000 and 2002.111
Representative Zoe Lofgren of California's Silicon Valley" 2 and
Senator Charles Robb of Virginia," 3 both Democrats, introduced a
more radical proposal:" 4 "a new class of immigration visas, the T-Visa,
for foreign-born technology workers who have gained degrees on
American campuses." 1 5 They propose new, unlimited "Tech-visas"
for recent foreign graduates of American graduate programs in sci-
ence and engineering, who are currently on student visas." 6 To qual-
ify for a T-Visa, the foreign applicant must hold a job offer for a
position with an annual salary of $60,000 or more. 1 7 This class of
visas would have no annual cap and would allow the worker to remain
in the United States for five years. 118 Employers of T-Visa foreign
workers are liable for $1000 per visa, which the government would
then use to support science, mathematics, and technology education
in America's public schools." 9
108 H.R. 2698, 106th Cong. (1999).
109 See Foreign Tech-Worker Bill Draws Criticism, BoSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 1999, at C2;
Marjorie Valbrun, Renewed Bids for Visas for High-Tech Workers Reflect the Political Influence of
Silicon Valley, WALL ST.J., Sept. 15, 1999, at A34.
110 See New Workers for Economic Growth Act, S. 1440, 106th Cong. (1999).
111 See H.R. 2698 § 101(a); S. 1440 § 101(a); Foreign Tech-Worker Bill Draws Criticism,
supra note 109, at C2; Valbrun, supra note 109, at A34.
112 See Jim Puzzanghera, Visas Pushed for High-Tech Workers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEvs,
Aug. 5, 1999, at Cl. Representative Lofgren notes, "[it has never made sense to me that,
after allowing foreign students to study at our fine American universities, we force some of
the best and brightest minds in the world to leave America and relocate to other countries
to compete against us.'" Id. According to Lofgren, 60% of the H-lB visa applications on
the INS's waiting list are for foreign students in the United States with job offers here. See
id.
113 See Cassandra Burrell, Special High-Tech Visa Proposed, AVSTIN AzM.-STATEMAN, Oct. 22,
1999, at D3. Senator Robb echoed Representative Lofgren's concern about losing skilled
foreign graduates of U.S. schools due to visa caps: "'[W] e get into a situation where we're
losing our seed corn.'" Robb Unveils Visa Measure for High Tech Graduates, CONGRESS DAILY,
Sept. 29, 1999, available at 1999 WL 27684993 (alteration in original).
114 See Helping Improve Technology Education and Competitiveness Act ("HITEC
Act"), S. 1645, 106th Cong. (1999); Bringing Resources from Academia to the Industry of
Our Nation Act ("BRAIN Act"), H.R 2687, 106th Cong. (1999).
115 Towle, supra note 103, at 1C.
116 See Puzzanghera, supra note 112, at Cl; Towle, supra note 103, at 1C. According to
Senator Robb, "the pool of such students nationwide is about 17,000." Towle, supra note
103, at IC.
117 See Puzzanghera, supra note 112, at Cl; Towle, supra note 103, at IC.
118 See Puzzanghera, supra note 112, at Cl.
119 See Burrell, supra note 113, at D3.
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The high-tech workforce shortage and H-1B visa cap also loom
large in the minds of the candidates in the 2000 presidential race. 20
Among various proposals and comments by the candidates on the is-
sue is an interesting proposal that Senator John McCain made during
his unsuccessful campaign for the Republican nomination. In Octo-
ber 1999, Senator McCain, Chairman of the Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, joined the H-1B legislation fray
and introduced the 21st Century Technology Resources and Commer-
cial Leadership Act.121 The bill abandons the H-1B visa quota until
2006; it does not impose any specific cap on H-1B visas, but instead
lets market forces control.122 Under McCain's proposal, a substantial
portion of the current H-1B visa application fee (51.3%) would help
fund science and technology education and retraining programs. 123
As a latest congressional effort to raise the H-1B visa cap and to
amend the program, a bipartisan group of twenty senators introduced
a bill, the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act
of 2000,124 in February 2000. The bill would raise the H-1B visa cap by
80,000 for fiscal year 2000, 87,500 for 2001, and 130,000 for 2002.125
Furthermore, the bill provides an exemption from the H-1B visa cap
for aliens who received graduate degrees from U.S. institutions or
work at "an institution of higher education," "a nonprofit research
organization," or "a governmental research organization."1 26
Meanwhile, the INS has struggled in the bureaucratic quagmire
to implement the ACWIA's expanded H-1B visa program. To its great
embarrassment the INS discovered in October 1999 that it had mistak-
enly exceeded, by as many as 20,000, the annual statutory cap of
115,000 H-1B visas.127 According to INS officials, "[t]he error oc-
curred when visa approval numbers from the four INS service centers
that process H-lB applications didn't make their way to the agency's
main computer system in Washington-which tracks totals."128 The
INS's latest fiasco-which chairman Lamar Smith of the House judici-
ary immigration subcommittee called the "'latest self-inflicted wound
120 See Jennifer Jones, Presidential Candidates Weigh in on Technology for Super Tuesday
Primaries, INroWoau DALY NEws, Feb. 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22973948.
121 S. 1804, 106th Cong. (1999); see McCain Bill to Maintain U.S. Leadership in Technology
Industry, CONG. PREss RELEASES, Oct. 27, 1999 (visited Feb. 7, 2000) <http://
Nvw.senate.gov/-mccain/hlB.htm> [hereinafter McCain Bill].
122 See McCain Bill.
123 See id,
124 S. 2045, 106th Cong. (1999).
125 See id. § 2.
126 Id. § 3.
127 See Michelle Mittelstadt, High-Tech Vzsa Error Leaves Congress Livid, Ausmrx A.-
STATESMAN, Oct. 13, 1999, at Dl. Later, the INS recanted its admission of an H-1B visa
miscount, but stated that it did not know how many visas it issued for fiscal year 1999. See
Kim S. Nash, Feds Backpedal on H-1B Visa Miscount, CouTEaRvo=a, Oct. 18, 1999, at 94.
128 Mittelstadt, supra note 127, at Dl.
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by the agency's inept management'"129 -could not have come at a
worse time. News of this error surfaced as the House of Representa-
fives began to hold hearings on bipartisan legislation to dramatically
reorganize the INS by splitting it into two distinct agencies within the
DOJ.i3 0 Officials have not yet decided how to correct the error, but
the INS's options include the reduction of the H-lB visa allotment for
the fiscal year 2000 by the number of excess 1999 visas or the revoca-
tion of the H-lB visas issued after reaching the 1999 statutory cap.' 13
Either way it is likely to inflame both the high-tech industry and
Congress. l3 2
II
CRIcAL EXAMINATION OF THE ACWIA & A PROPOSAL
FOR NEW REFORM
The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform recommends that
"a proper balance must be struck in the [H-IB visa program] between
enhancing the productivity and global competitiveness of the U.S.
economy through access to foreign workers and protecting U.S. work-
ers against unfair competition."133 The sponsor of the original H-lB
visa bill has also stated that the purpose of the ACWIA is to "protect
the competitiveness of American business in the global marketplace
and improve economic and career opportunities for American citi-
zens."13 4 This Part of the Note argues that despite being an improve-
ment over the previous H-lB visa program, the current program does
not adequately meet the goals voiced by the U.S. Commission on Im-
migration Reform and the bill's sponsor: effective protection of the
American competitiveness and of the domestic workforce. This Note
proposes an improvement of the H-1B visa program aimed at effectu-
ating these objectives.
A. The H-lB Visa Program as a Tool for Enhancing American
Competitiveness
American industry, especially the IT industry, has recently
learned the value of the H-lB visa program in global economic and
technological competition. H-1B program advocates assert that "the
program fills a legitimate need created by shortages of certain skills in
the domestic workforce."135 In the face of the ever-increasing global-
129 Id. (quoting Representative Lamar Smith).
130 See id. For further discussion of recent congressional efforts to reorganize the INS,
see infra note 177 and accompanying text.
131 See Mittelstadt, supra note 127, at DI.
132 See id.
133 BECOMING AN AMERiCAN, supra note 2, at 78.
134 144 CONG. Rxc. S12,748 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
135 Potamianos, supra note 20, at 799.
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ization of markets and technology, arguably "[t]he H-1B program is
not a domestic work force scourge, but rather an economic boon that
... allows the United States to remain at the forefront of the global
economy."136 Therefore, the program ought to maximize its potential
economic benefits by increasing its efficiency and flexibility, the ability
to easily adapt to the fast changing global economy.
1. Underutilization of the H-lB Visa Program Under the ACWA
Despite its proven usefulness, the current H-lB visa program
under the ACWIA still unduly restricts American business from opti-
mally utilizing the program in pursuit of economic competitiveness. 3 7
For example, even the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform,
which generally favors more restrictive immigration law, "recognizes
that [the annual visa cap or numerical] limitations might reduce the
flexibility of businesses in adapting to economic changes." 138 The AC-
WIA's temporary increase of annual visa quotas for a limited three-
year period does not provide enough flexibility for American busi-
nesses in the face of the fast-changing world economy; capping annual
H-lB admissions at an arbitrary number does not accord with the un-
predictable, fast-paced, and fiercely competitive global high-tech labor
markets of the twenty-first century. 3 9 As the continuing H-lB visa cap
crisis demonstrates, 14° visa caps arbitrarily determined by the legisla-
ture fail to accurately predict the needs of industry. No matter how
high Congress sets the visa cap, industry will continue to be uncertain
about whether it will have a sufficient number of skilled workers in the
following year.141 This uncertainty and confusion will inevitably result
in high-tech firms moving overseas, closer to the ready source of
skilled human capital. 142
136 1&. at 810.
137 See Katayama & Kinney, supra note 80, at 15.
138 LEGAL IMMIGRATION, supra note 5, at 170.
'39 The perceived threat of the Year 2000 (Y2K) bug in microchips posing potentially
grave threats to computers in large U.S. firms and government agencies might have acted
as a catalyst in increasing the demand for foreign IT professionals in recent years. See New
H-1B Visa Rules-The Devil Is in the Details, Bus. LutE (THE HINDu), Nov. 10, 1998, available at
1998 WL 20731170. The article also points out that:
[T]he provision that the number of visas will revert to the present 65,000
level in 2002, seems to have been tailored to suit the needs of the US with
respect to the Y2K bug....
[The] provision in the [new H-1B visa] bill seems to have been conve-
niently designed to allow [foreign] programmers to be imported for tack-
ling all the "dirty Y2K jobs" and do away with the need for extra
programmers once the problem has been solved.
Id.; see also 144 CONG. REC. S4957 (daily ed. May 18, 1998) (statement of Sen. Abraham)
(arguing that the increase of the H-1B visa cap is vital to overcome the Y2K problem).
140 See supra Part II.D.
141 See Branigin, supra note 101, at A4.
142 See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, commentators refute arguments that only a strict
numerical limitation coupled with a restriction on the permissible du-
ration of stay can adequately protect domestic workers and reduce the
adverse impact of the H-1B program on the domestic workforce.143
One commentator argues:
Placing a numerical limit on the H-1B category limits the U.S.
information technology and other business sectors that need access
to a global workforce to compete in the international arena. It also
fails to recognize that existing laws and regulations which safeguard
wages and working conditions can, with proper enforcement, pro-
tect U.S. workers from unfair competition.' 44
Professor Alan Sykes argues that the current ceiling on the number of
temporary worker admissions lacks compelling justification:
Temporary workers are .. .less likely than permanent immigrants
to be a net drain on the public sector, given that these workers pay
taxes just like anyone else, federal funds cannot be used to provide
them with public safety net benefits, and their right to remain in the
country generally depends on continuing employment. Further,...
the likelihood that temporary workers would enter in substantial
numbers in competition with unemployed domestic workers seems
minimal-other things being equal, employers are likely to prefer an
unemployed domestic worker whose skills are more readily verifia-
ble and for whom the transaction costs of obtaining a visa are
avoidable.145
In addition, bureaucratic disincentives and inefficiencies plague
the current H-lB visa program and hinder the effective protection of
American competitiveness and business interests. One commentator
posits that "placing increased bureaucracy and regulation on the pro-
cess of recruiting H-lB workers can jeopardize the ability of American
high-tech companies to meet intense time-to-market pressures for de-
143 See, e.g., LEGAL IMMIGRATION, supra note 5, at 170 (recommending an examination
of the advantages and disadvantages of setting quota and durational limits on nonimmi-
grant, skill-based admissions). Immigration advocates attending the Immigration Work-
shop held at the Hoover Institution in October 1996 argued for "increasing the flow of
highly skilled workers," because "immigrants did not take jobs from Americans or create
unemployment but instead added wealth to the United States and created jobs and busi-
nesses." Peter Duignan & L.H. Gann, Conclusion, in THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES
OVER IMMIGRATION, supra note 9, at 257, 257. Other commentators argued that despite
some adverse impact due to job competition from imported foreign workers, "negative
consequences affected only a few people while most benefited-as they had from free
trade-from falling consumer costs and rising productivity, which resulted in job growth."
Id- at 258. Some "wondered why we made it so difficult for skilled, talented people to come
to the United States." Id.; see also Chang, supra note 2, at 1207 (relying on empirical studies
to suggest that "immigration has only a weak effect on native wages") (footnote omitted).
144 Michael F. Turansick, ReviewingPast Decade in the Field, N.Y. LJ.,June 14,1999, at 9.
145 Alan 0. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an




livering products."1 4 6 Under the newly amended program, potential
H-lB employers'have to endure burdensome and lengthy application
processes in two agencies, submitting the visa petition to the INS and
the labor condition application to the DOL."47 As the INS's recent
miscount of the number of H-lB visas issued in 1999 demonstrates, 148
the current inefficiency and incompetency in handling the H-lB pro-
gram creates uncertainty and confusion for American industry. Amer-
ican businesses desperately need a more efficient and expedited H-lB
program in order to remain competitive and adapt to rapid changes
in the global market.
The recent H-1B visa cap crisis has accentuated the shift in focus
of immigration policy: immigration as a policy tool to support the
globalized technology-driven economy. Regardless of nationality,
workers skilled in the newest technologies comprise the hottest com-
modities.149 The economic benefits of the temporary presence of a
large number of highly-educated skilled workers in the U.S. would far
outweigh the adverse effects from the potential abuses of the H-lB
employers and employees. 150 For example, one possible benefit of a
broader H-lB visa program would be the prevention of the flight of
domestic high-tech, high-profit-yielding industry overseas. 15 1 Employ-
ment-based nonimmigrant visa programs such as the current H-lB
program can serve as a valuable and efficient policy device to enhance
U.S. business competitiveness in global economic and technological
markets.152
146 Costello et al., supra note 9, at 251.
147 See, e.g., Hong & Swaim, supra note 84, at 26 (emphasizing that all H-lB employers
will be burdened by the various ACWIA restrictions, including the daunting task of "having
to calculate and document their non-H-lB dependent status each time they file an H-lB
petition").
148 See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
149 Joseph B. Costello and his cowriters emphasize the crucial importance of skilled
workers to high-tech industry:
In the rawest terms, the fate of a high-tech company rests primarily on the
technical knowledge of the employees and, by extension, its capacity to gar-
ner the best and brightest available for hire. Intel chairman Andy Grove,
often quoted in discussions of the issue, says that watching his workers leave
the office every day at five o'clock is the scariest moment of his work day.
That's when all the company's assets get into a car and drive onto a
crowded freeway.
Costello et al., supra note 9, at 242-43.
150 See, e.g., id. at 245-46 (arguing that employment-based immigration programs, such
as the H-lB visa program, have "fuel[ed] the explosive growth of Silicon Valley companies"
by providing "the ability to enlist global talent," and as a result have become "one of the
most crucial arteries of high-tech companies").
151 See, e.g., Duignan & Gann, supra note 143, at 258 ("If we could not import skilled
people because of shortages in the United States, we would have to go offshore, main-
tained Joseph Costello, CEO of Cadence Design Systems of San Jose.").
152 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 2, at 1149-50 ("[T]he free movement of workers across
borders promotes economic welfare by promoting free trade in the labor market. ...
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2. Proposal for Liberalization of the H-1B Visa Program
This Note proposes the liberalization of the current H-lB visa
program according to Professor Howard Chang's free trade approach
to immigration policy.153 Following this economic-interest-oriented
approach, this Note proposes the complete elimination of the annual
numerical cap on H-lB visas' 54 and a further simplification of the visa
petition process. Reforming the current H-lB visa program according
Indeed, studies suggest that the gains to the world economy from removing immigration
barriers could well be enormous and greatly exceed the gains from removing trade barri-
ers.") (footnote omitted).
153 Professor Howard F. Chang proposes an elaborate solution to achieve an optimal
immigration policy based on free trade principles. See id. at 1154-55. Using this economic
analysis, he explores the features of an immigration policy and concludes the most advan-
tageous form is that of an immigration tariff. See id According to Professor Chang, "this
tariff could take the form of an income tax that discriminates between natives and immi-
grants," instead of quota or other regulatory restrictions, and that "skilled immigration
should be permitted (indeed encouraged) without quantitative or other protectionist re-
strictions." Id. at 1155. Under this analysis, "[i]mmigration restrictions... destroy wealth
by causing economic distortions... [and] prevent employers from hiring foreign workers
even if the value that they would produce exceeds the wage that would be paid to the
worker." I. at 1159. Chang argues that "[p]rotectionist policies in the immigration con-
text.., are inappropriate in much the same way that they are inappropriate in the context
of international trade in goods." Id at 1208. In essence, he calls for maximizing the total
national economic welfare through liberalized immigration policy and enhancing welfare
of individual native workers through appropriate fiscal policy. See id. at 1243. But seeJu-
uAN L. SIMON, THE EcoNoMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 337 (1989) ("Contrary to
intuition, the theory of the international trade of goods is quite inapplicable to the interna-
tional movement of persons.").
154 Total elimination of the H-lB visa quota is not as politically unviable as it first ap-
pears. In his speech at the San Francisco Commonwealth Club in August 1999, Senator
John McCain pointed to the inadequacy of continual expansion of the quota: "'I say that
we should eliminate these artificial limits altogether, and allow the technology industry's
leaders to work with the Department of Labor to set an appropriate level of visas to meet
their needs each year.'" Alex Cukan, Too Many Immigrants?, UPI News, Oct. 18, 1999, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, Wire Service Stories File (emphasis added). Recently, Los
Angeles immigration attorney Carl Shusterman presented a similar proposal but limited it
to foreign academic, nonprofit, or government researchers. See INS Runs Out of H-lB Visas,
Lawryer Shusterman Suggests Solution, PR NEvswiRa, June 15, 1999, available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File, All. He argues that the INS already "'acknowledges that em-
ployers of government and other non-profit researchers are engaged in activities beneficial
to society, and [even] exempts them from the customary $500 H-1B processing fee.'" Id
(quoting Shusterman). Thus, he argues that the INS should treat these workers as a sepa-
rate category. Id. Shusterman's interim solution is ingenious, because the proposal is "far
less problematic politically than a raise in the [H-1B visa] cap, while still freeing up a
considerable number of visas." Id. However, it is still not a long-term solution to the cur-
rent H-lB problem. For a proposal by Senator Charles Robb and Representative Zoe Lof-
gren creating a new, unlimited T-visa category for foreign skilled workers educated in U.S.
universities, see supra Part II.D. For a suggestion that the solution is changing the perma-
nent immigration system, but not the nonimmigrant visa programs such as the H-1B visa
program, see James R. EdwardsJr., Widen the Doorfor Skiled Foreigners, CHIusm& Sc. MONI-
TOR, Jan. 10, 2000, at 11 (proposing to eliminate the H-1B visa program and shift the
immigration system's focus to the education and job skills of potential immigrants).
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to free trade principles would provide the requisite flexibility for U.S.
companies to compete successfully in the global economy.
Recent proposals to dramatically increase the H-lB visa cap 155 or
to create a special class of "Tech" visas with no annual cap for skilled
foreign workers educated in the United States1 56 would provide a
measure of reprieve from the current visa cap crisis. However, like the
1998 ACWIA, these proposals fail to offer a permanent solution and
will inevitably lead to another visa cap crisis in the future. The better
solution lies in eliminating the root of the crisis-the numerical cap
on H-lB visas-and in focusing on the prevention of potential adverse
consequences.
The political rhetoric of the debate surrounding the H-lB visa
program is probably the biggest obstacle to liberalizing the program.
The H-lB program's legislative history since its 1990 enactment under
IMMACT has consistently reflected politically popular anti-immigrant,
nativist protectionism. 157 However, as the booming high-tech IT in-
dustry-the largest employer of H-1B workers-amply illustrates, 158
the employment of skilled foreign workers under the H-lB program
has provided a boon to the U.S. economy.15 9 Therefore, the liberali-
155 See supra notes 108-11, 120-26 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text; see also note 154 (describing other
similar proposals to eliminate the visa cap for a limited class).
157 See Costello et al., supra note 9, at 240-41 ("Ironically, today's heightened public
pressure to stave off iegal immigration comes at a time when key sectors of the U.S. econ-
omy need to rely more heavily than ever on legal, employment-based immigration. The
danger is that negative attitudes about one domain unduly shape negative attitudes about
another."); id. at 241 ("In a climate hostile to immigration, nativist language can be seduc-
tive to politicians running for reelection."); id. at 251 ("The xenophobia underlying to-
day's immigration reform movements threatens to erase America's early lead in high
tech."); see also Michael D. Patrick, Nonimmigrant Work Visas; Hatian Relief N.Y. LJ., Nov. 23,
1998, at 3 (reporting that the H-1B visa cap debate is not solely about wage or other labor-
related issues, but also about "politics as usual [because] political commentators still view
immigration as a relatively 'hot button' topic"); cf. 144 CONG. Rxc. E2323 (daily ed. Nov.
12, 1998) (statement of Rep. Smith) ("[W]hen interpreting the statutory language, each
provision should be read in the light most protective of American workers."); SIMON, supra
note 153, at 310 ("Another difficulty in discussing a guestworker policy is that there is a
tendency to consider guestworkers as second-class citizens, and to argue against a
guestworker policy because it creates an ethically unacceptable division of classes."); Sykes,
supra note 145, at 158 ("Much like tariffs and quotas, immigration restrictions are a form of
protectionism, insulating domestic workers from competition in the labor market.").
158 See supra note 9.
159 The H-1B program has undeniably made a significant contribution to the current
economic boom of the United States:
[The H-1B program] has allowed the United States computer industry to
remain on the forefront of the global computing revolution....
The H-1B program is not a domestic work force scourge, but rather an
economic boon that, at least in the computer industry, allows the United
States to remain at the forefront of the global economy.
Potamianos, supra note 20, at 809-10. Modem high-tech industry has its own special needs
for a flexible and efficient H-1B visa program:
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zation of the H-lB program does not represent the gratuitous open-
ing of the U.S. border to an influx of wealth-seeking foreigners, but
rather comprises a valuable economic policy tool to control and en-
hance American competitiveness. In this sense, the liberalization of
the H-lB program is much like international trade or tourism: 160 that
the presence of more foreign goods or foreign tourists in the U.S.-if
regulated wiselym-can improve the welfare of Americans. 161 As one
commentator has noted, "' [e]veryone thinks about immigration in
political terms; it's time to think about immigration in terms of mar-
kets."' 62 Another commentator notes that "[w]hat needs to be
capped is nativist xenophobia."' 63
B. Protection of Labor Interests Under the H-1B Visa Program
The potential adverse effects of the H-1B program on the domes-
tic workforce, such as wage depression, increased unemployment rate,
and age discrimination, and possibility of employers abusing the pro-
gram against vulnerable foreign workers are real and must be taken
seriously. This is especially true when one contemplates the complete
lifting of the visa cap. The creators of the H-lB visa program have
apparently focused more on the immigration aspects of the program-
the H-1B visa cap-than on the labor-protection mechanisms of the
program.'6 This Section of the Note addresses the inadequacy of the
labor-protective safeguards in the current H-lB program and pro-
poses a possible solution.
In an industry where employees are far and away the number one asset,
high-tech companies need to fill job openings quickly to stay in business.
The narrow window of opportunity to market a high-tech product drives
the pace at which companies hire. If a company can't find enough good
engineers to turn a concept into a shipping product within a reasonable
time frame, another company will likely dominate that market area....
... This ... means competing for a global pool of human resources.
Costello et al., supra note 9, at 246.
160 See BECOMING AN AMERICAN, supra note 2, at 76 ("The benefits of a well-regulated
system of [limited duration admissions or] LDAs are palpable. LDAs represent a consider-
able boon to the U.S. economy.").
161 But see Roy BECK, THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION 136-55 (1996) (arguing against
the importation of foreign skilled workers on the ground that it harms welfare of the
American workforce and the future of American students in technical fields). For diverse
views on the impact of immigration in general on the welfare and employment of natives,
see generally GEORGEJ. BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE
U.S. ECONOMY 79-96 (1990) (same); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS:
ECONOMIC DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FIsCAL EFFECrs OF IMMIGRATION 135-253 (1997) (same); Si-
MON, supra note 153 (discussing the economic implications of immigration).
162 Editorial, Immigration for Growth, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1999, at A18 (quoting the
spokesman of the National Immigration Forum).
163 Editorial, Capping Nativism, DETROr NEvs, Feb. 18, 2000, at AO.
164 See Timothy Burn, Smugglers, Criminals Abuse Visa Program: Passes Designed for Skilled
Workers, WASH. TiMEs, May 6, 1999, at Al.
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1. Inadequacy of Labor-Protective Safeguards in the ACWIA
Despite the large potential benefit of the H-1B visa program for
the U.S. economy, the program also has proven fertile grounds for
potential abuses by H-1B employers against both domestic workforce
and foreign IT workers on temporary H-1B visas. Since the inception
of the H-1B program, there have been various reports of its abuses.
Some abuses of the program-age discrimination by replacing older
native workers with a younger (and thus cheaper) foreign skilled
workers-are directed against domestic workforce. 165 Others are di-
rected against H-B foreign workers, exploiting the vulnerability of
their temporary visa status.166
Past reports of abuse by H-1B employers clearly illustrate the
need for stronger, more direct supervisory mechanisms within the H-
1B program. 167 However, except in the case of H-lB dependent em-
ployers, who comprise the minority of H-1B employers, the labor-pro-
tective safeguards and enforcement mechanisms are still not adequate
under the amended H-1B program.168 Thus, the potential for em-
ployer abuse of the H-1B program remains.
One commentator has argued that the opportunity for H-1B
workers to change firms via petition can obviate the possibility of ex-
ploitation of the skilled foreign workers by their H-1B employers. 169
As he has argued, "'[Y]ou cannot pay foreign-born engineers less.
These are smart people, if you try to fool with them, then they will go
someplace else. '" 70 However, this mere possibility is not a sufficient
165 See, e.g., Stephanie Neil, H-1B Safety NetFailslT Workers, PC WK., Nov. 16, 1998, at 32
(reporting a particularly egregious case of abuse by a H-1B employer in which a laid-off
native IT professional was ordered to train her replacement-a foreign IT professional on a
H-1B visa-before leaving the company and arguing that the new H-1B law is still fraught
with loopholes for the potential H-lB employers to engage in age discrimination of older
native IT workers).
166 See, e.g., Barb Cole-Gomolski, The Many Faces of the H-B Program, COMPuTERvoRLD,
Nov. 23, 1998, at 1 (describing contracting companies or "body shops" as the most fre-
quent abusers of the H-1B program, exploiting vulnerable H-1B workers); Miriam Rozen,
Invasion of the Bodyshoppers, DALLAS OBSERvER, Nov. 12, 1998, at 15 (describing the thriving
"body shop" industry in business of subcontracting out the H-1B workers to other compa-
nies with huge profit margin at the expense of the H-1B workers).
167 See, e.g., Alan T. Saracevic, Landlord Case Highlights Visa Issue: Alleged Misuse of Work
Permits Reignites Silicon Valley Controversy, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 23, 2000, at B1 (describing
various abuses of the H-1B visa program by both employers and employees and emphasiz-
ing the ineffectiveness of the INS's enforcement mechanism).
168 See BECOMING AN AMERICAN, supra note 2, at 96-102.
169 See Stuart Anderson, The Effect of Immigrant Scientists and Engineers on Wages and Em-
ployment in High Technology, in THE DEBArE IN THE UNITED STATES OVER IMMIGRATION, supra
note 9, at 224, 231 (reporting that "[s]ome companies even 'raid' other firms' H-1B em-
ployees, which indicates how competitive the marketplace is for talent in America today").




justification for inaction; there must be more effective protection for
domestic skilled workers potentially affected by the H-1B program.
2. Proposal for Consolidated Supervision Under the Department of
Labor
This Note proposes a structural reform of the H-1B visa program
by consolidating the supervisory function solely within the DOL in or-
der to provide adequate protection to the domestic workforce. The
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform proposed this approach in
1997 in its recommendation on general immigration system re-
form. 17 1 The Commission recommended the consolidation of all re-
sponsibility for enforcing immigration-related employment standards
for employers in the Department of Labor, because the DOL is "the
best equipped federal agency to regulate and investigate employer com-
pliance with standards intended to protect U.S. workers."' 72 Congress
should immediately implement the Commission's recommendation
for the H-1B visa program. This structural reform of the H-1B visa
program should not wait for the overall reform of the U.S. immigra-
tion system, which might take several years.
Under the proposal, the DOL would handle all aspects of the H-
1B petition and supervision process. The DOL would process H-1B
visa petitions, issue visas, police potential abuses of the program, and
examine the need for H-1B workers by industries with alleged domes-
tic labor shortages. This consolidation of supervision of the H-1B visa
program in a single agency with extensive experience in labor prac-
tices would help balance the growing labor needs of industry against
the desire for adequate employment protection for H-1B workers. 173
Consolidation would require strengthening DOL's supervisory and
policing powers and increasing funding for effective supervision.' 74
Additional funding for the H-1B program supervision could derive
from additional income taxes levied on H-1B workers.' 75 This struc-
tural reform would provide incentives to potential H-1B employers to
171 See BECOMING AN AMERICAN, supra note 2, at 148-53, 169-74. The Commission fur-
ther recommended that:
[A]n expedited process is needed for the admission of both temporary and
permanent foreign workers... as long as adequate safeguards are in place
to protect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. To prevent
abuse of an expedited system, an effective postadmission enforcement
scheme is necessary. DOL's other worksite enforcement responsibilities
place it in the best position to monitor employers' compliance with the
attestations submitted in the admissions process. DOL investigators are ex-
perienced in examining employment records and interviewing employees.
I6 at liii-liv.
172 ik at 169-70.
173 See id
174 See id. at 100-01.
175 See Chang, supra note 2, at 1161.
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not abuse, 176 while reaping significant benefits from the program and
maintaining their competitiveness in the global market.
Recently, Congress began actively pushing for overhauling the
INS by splitting it into two distinct agencies within the DOJ.177 Grow-
ing frustration with the INS's inefficiency and incompetency, espe-
cially among high-tech industry and other large H-1B employers, 178
will likely accelerate the INS reform movement. However, the poten-
tial benefits of having two functionally distinct DOJ immigration agen-
cies to supervise the H-lB program are far from clear. Congress's
current INS reform proposal specifically addresses the problem
unique to the INS and the immigration system: conflict arising from
the INS's current "dual roles of enforcing immigration law and help-
ing immigrants."1 79 The inadequacies of the current H-1B visa pro-
gram should not be viewed as immigration policy issues per se, but
economic and labor policy issues requiring a different, sui generis pre-
scription like the one that this Note has offered. This Note proposes
that the H-1B visa program be placed outside the traditional immigra-
tion system as defined by the current INS, so that agencies responsible
for economic and labor policymaking would have more direct control
over the program.
176 Strengthened enforcement power under a consolidated agency would also be effec-
tive against the problem of H-lB visa fraud by sham companies. See Bum, supra note 164,
at Al (describing the pervasive problem of H-lB visa fraud in India, China, and Russia and
the inability of the INS to remedy the problem due to "understaffing, lack of training and a
shortage of management").
177 In July 1999, Republican Representative Harold Rogers introduced a bill, Immigra-
tion Reorganization and Improvement Act of 1999, H.L 2528, 106th Cong., to split the
INS into two independent agencies within the DOJ-the Bureau of Immigration Services
and the Bureau of Immigration Enforcement. See H.R. 2528; see also Marcus Stem, Three
House Lawmakers Launch Campaign to Reorganize the INS, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 16,
1999, at A10 (reporting the introduction of the bill). Despite wide support at the outset,
the INS reorganization bill failed to materialize in the fall of 1999 due to disagreement
between the Republican Congress, the Clinton administration, and immigration advocates.
SeeJoe Cantlupe, Despite Vows, Politicos Fail to Break Up INS-Wel4 Maybe Next Year, SAN DIEGO
UNIoN-TRIB., Nov. 27, 1999, at Al. See generally David A. Martin, Legislation to Reorganize INS
Overlooks Bureaucratic Flaws, N.J. L.J., Sept. 13, 1999, at 23 (criticizing the recent Republi-
can-led plan to reorganize the INS). In March 2000, House Republicans reintroduced the
same bill to split the INS. See Immigration Reorganization and Improvement Act of 1999,
H.R 3918, 106th Cong. (2000). In the face of vigorous opposition by the White House and
Democrats in Congress, the fate of this bill remains uncertain. See Dena Bunis, Politics Stalls
Reform of INS, ORANGE Couwm REG., Mar. 23, 2000, at A23 ("A House panel passed an INS
reform bill that not only has no chance of becoming law, but probably set back efforts to
resolve the INS mess."); Sean Scully, GOP Lawmakers Want INS Divided, WAsH. TIMEs, Mar.
23, 2000, at A6 (reporting the opposition to the bill by Democrats and the White House).
Nevertheless, "'[tlhere is a consensus across the board that the INS needs to be fundamen-
tally restructured.... The debate is over how.'" Marisa Taylor, Talk of Overhauling the.NS
Has Wide Backing, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 5, 1999, at 21 (quoting Frank Sharry,
director of an immigrant advocacy group).
178 See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.




This Note has examined the congressional amendment of the H-
IB visa program under the American Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Act of 1998. Despite some improvements to the H-1B
program, the ACWIA only provides temporary stopgap solutions for
the protection of American competitiveness and the domestic
workforce. In attempting to respond to both the high-tech industry
and a pro-labor constituency simultaneously, Congress has achieved in
the ACWIA only a short-term political compromise. American busi-
ness needs a permanent reform of the H-lB visa program that can
truly promote national economic interests and protect the domestic
workforce.
To improve the current H-lB program, this Note proposes the
full liberalization of the H-lB program via the relaxation of various
quantitative and qualitative restrictions on the importation of foreign
skilled workers, and the consolidation of the supervisory responsibili-
ties for the H-lB program in the DOL. With appropriate labor-protec-
tive safeguards in place through a structural reform of the H-1B
program, the liberalization of the H-1B program and the removal of
various administrative restrictions would effectively protect the na-
tional economic interest and the welfare of the domestic workforce.
These measures would transform the current H-lB program from a
temporary political appeasement of both high-tech industry and labor
to a more permanent and valuable economic policy tool. The fully
optimized and liberalized H-1B visa program would promote Ameri-
can competitiveness and, by extension, the welfare of all Americans in
the twenty-first century.
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